The Church’s Role in the Congolese Political Crisis

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Christian Mukadi, SJ 

The Church’s Role in the Congolese Political Crisis

Christian Mukadi, SJ 

The socio-political crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo affects more than seventy million people in the heart of Africa. While the government in Kinshasa would like to keep power at any cost, the majority of Congolese are eager to get rid of this ineffective and oppressive regime. The standoff has created deep distrust between the population and the government under President Kabila, and the socio-economic fabric unravels day by day.

The end of the Cold War and the advent of perestroika witnessed the debilitation of African dictatorships. Towards the 1990s, Africans experienced a wave of national dialogues known as Sovereign National Conferences (SNC). These forums favored the move from one-party to multi-party government in several countries. In DR Congo, several political forums continued following the country’s repeated crises: ‘Victoria Falls I and II, Lusaka, Pretoria, Durban, Port Louis, Nairobi, Windhoek, Dodoma, Sirte, Gaborone, Sun City, Conference on Peace, Security and Development in North Kivu and South Kivu, National Dialogue of 2014’(Ndiaye 2015), as well as the last negotiations of the Kinshasa Interdiocesan Center. For nearly four years, President Kabila staged a series of dialogues to defuse the crisis, but in the end they were revealed to be a mere monologue intended to split his opponents and to hold on to power. That has increased frustration from the opposition and civil society, and triggered their radicalization.

Let us recall that real dialogue is a practice embedded in the African tradition. In ‘the Africa of the Villages’(Jean Marc Ela), through palaver (originally a Portuguese term for traders’negotiation with Africans) people aimed to recover a lost social consensus and to restart a defective, inoperative socio-political system. In the search for a consensus the participants are enriched through sharing different approaches and viewpoints. Four essential criteria for a true dialogue are the participants’frankness, the mediator’s impartiality, a climate of trust, and a practice of inclusiveness. It is not possible to have a dialogue that is not open to the other side, because ‘all discourse is an implicit admission that one realizes there are things one does not know, ... thanks to which one can be open to the alterity’(Onaotsho Kawende, 36-9).

The Impasse of the Electoral Process

Since the beginning of the Third Republic on 18 February 2006, DR Congo has twice held general presidential and legislative elections, the first in November 2006 and the second in November 2011. Both elections resulted in the controversial victories of Joseph Kabila as president and of his political family in the national parliament. These elections were tainted withirregularities (according to reports from national and international observers: EU, Carters Foundation, International Organization of Francophonie, CENCO, etc. Some claim that ‘Joseph Kabila would not have won these elections without fraud. The atmosphere on the ground on polling day revealed that the Congolese people wanted a change. There is no doubt about that’(Camille Belsoeur, 28 Novembre 2011 in JeuneAfrique).

In response to political turmoil, President Kabila said he would be ‘open to dialogue’with the opposition to ease the tensions. He convened the National Concertation in September 2013, in order to reach ‘a nation-wide consensus and a solid grounding for peace.’But many of his opponents did not take part in the forum. It was followed by the National Consultations of all social strata in May 2015 and a National Dialogue starting in September 2016. All turned out to be inconclusive.

As Kabila’s second and final term neared at end, the focus of debate changed from a ‘nationwide consensus and a solid grounding for peace’to the departure of the president. His opponents suspected him of seeking to hold onto power beyond the two terms limit, in violation of the Constitution. They formed alliances such as the ‘Rassemblement’(Rally of Political and Social Forces United for Change), Alliance for the Republic, Citizens’Front, and Union for the Congolese Nation. On the other side the president and his coalition formed Presidential Majority (known as ‘the Majority’).

19 December 2016 marked the end of Kabila’s second term and it was determining for the future of Congo. It became technically impossible to organize presidential elections within the constitutional deadline. ‘Slippage’—an action to delay the deadlines—was inevitable. Uncertainty and anxiety spread throughout the country. Dialogue seemed to be the only way to allow the Congolese ‘to be by and for themselves, by and in the articulation of having and doing, in an order that excludes violence and arbitrariness’(Eboussi-Boulaga 1977).

The African Union City Forum

Two major forums—one facilitated by the envoy of the African Union, Edem Kodjo, and the other led by the bishops of the CENCO (the National Episcopal Conference of Congo)—attempted to resolve the crisis through dialogue.

From 1 September to 18 October 2016 a forum took place at the African Union City in Kinshasa. It reached agreement on thecreation of a transitional coalition government whereby President Kabila would stay on until the organization of elections in April 2018, and the Presidential Majority, the opposition, and the Civil Society would share power, with a Prime Minister coming from the opposition. 

However, this forum amounted to little more than monologues from both sides. His critics think that its organizer Edem Kodjo gave his blessing to the violation of Article 70 of the Constitution on the voting method and the term of the presidential office. He did not fulfill the four criteria listed above for a dialogue worthy of the name. Inclusiveness was lacking, since the larger portion of the opposition boycotted the talks, while the CENCO and part of the civil society withdrew from the forum. 

In fact, most Congolese perceived the forum as a meeting of ‘old friends,’and as a venue for power sharing. The fact that the organization of the elections depends on the availability of financial means has given President Kabila the benefit of a blank-check presidency. He did not show any will to secure finances and meet the constitutional deadline. 

In short, this first forum was unable to solve the political crisis. The agreement resulting from the monologue of the ruling majority with a segment of the opposition and civil society did not reach a consensus that could lead the country toward peaceful elections.

The Interdiocesan Center Dialogue 

Shortly after this forum, divisions broke out among Congolese politicians, the signatories of the 18 October 2016 agreement on one side and the non-signatories on the other. The latter vowed to see Kabila step down immediately after 19 December 2016 or face a popular uprising. The necessity to defuse the socio-political tension impelled the President to turn to the Catholic Church through CENCO hoping they could secure a wider consensus among politicians. In fact, the Church has played a decisive role in the DRC’s complex history, above all its key mediation in the advent of democracy in the early 1990s. CENCO welcomed the President’s call, convinced that ‘only an inclusive dialogue that respects the constitutional framework... is the appropriate path for resolving the crisis’(Utembi 2016).

Unlike the previous overcrowded forum (around 280 participants), the CENCO gathered thirty participants from all components of the society. It lasted from 8 December 2016 to the adoption of an inclusive agreement signed on 31 December 2016 (known as the St Sylvester Agreement). This stipulated that (1) President Kabila and all other government structures would remain until the organization of the presidential, legislative, and municipal elections in December 2017; (2) the Prime Minister's post would return to the non-signatory opposition of the October deal; (3) the Constitution must not be modified before elections; (4) measures of relaxation by freeing political prisoners and exiles should be taken.

Nonetheless, the delaying tactics of some politicians in regard to signing particular deals already foreshadowed a glaring pitfall of the agreement implementation. At the end of the day, this forum was apparently transformed into a dialogue between Joseph Kabila and Étienne Tshisekedi, by proxy, the two great figures of the political scene during the talks. The CENCO presidium would refer directly to them to settle any deadlock whenever necessary. Sadly, while the dialogue was in full swing, the sudden death of Étienne Tshisekedi, Chairman of the ‘Rassemblement’and a strong critic of Kabila, obfuscated the outcome. A reconfiguration of the opposition, a crisis of leadership, and internal quarrels stemming from self-interest allowed the Kinshasa regime to alter the interpretation of the St Sylvester Agreement as it suited them. 

19 December 2016, should have marked the end of Joseph Kabila’s presidency in the country’s first democratic transfer of power since gaining independence in 1960. But two years later, he is still in power. Theoretically the only political roadmap for DR Congo is the Global and Inclusive Agreement of the Kinshasa Interdiocesan Center, backed by the international community. Failure to implement it in good faith and in its entirety has pushed back the country to the starting point: the political impasse, restriction of individuals’freedom, uncertainties about the electoral process, violent repression of any demonstrations against a political system that seeks to maintain control by every possible means.

The Church’s Role

Since the colonial era, the Catholic Church has played a major role in the political sphere and as a determining factor in the history of the country (Okitembo 1998). The Church is omnipresent in all sectors of Congolese society, from megacities to the remote villages, even where the state administration is almost non-existent. It provides nearly 50% of services, social welfare, education, health, and economic development, and is influential in microfinance through saving programs, cooperatives, and assistance of small businesses. This has certainly been a prophetic mission, though it has sometimes been tainted certain men of the Church who have perverted evangelical values.

The painful colonial period was characterized by a close collaboration between political and religious leaders, but with the accession of Joseph Mobutu as head of State, these relations deteriorated. One flashpoint concerned the State promulgation of the ideology of ‘Retour àl’authenticité,’the idea that everything must be grounded in the African (or better ‘Zairian’) cultural heritage. This aimed at ‘mental decolonization’of people who had assimilated the colonialist system. During this period, western style attire was banned for men, with the slogan ‘abacost’(àbas le costume, down with suits!), and the loincloth was considered civilian dress for women. Crosses were removed from public places, and all Zairians had to get rid of their Christian names because these had a foreign connotation; they disappeared from the civil register. Thus, Joseph Désirébecomes Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga, meaning the ‘Supreme Guide’and ‘Father of the Nation.’

In the late 1960s Zairianization was launched, a process that involved nationalizing all the properties of expatriates. In November 1973, Mobutu declared: ‘Zaire is the country that has been the most heavily exploited in the world. That is why, farms, ranches, plantations, concessions, commerce, and real estate agencies will be turned over to sons of the country.’Zairianization embodied a socio-political enforcement of the Retour àl’authenticité. It led to economic disaster on an unprecedented scale. The resistance of the Church, headed by Cardinal Malula (who came to see the ideology as a threat to Christianity) prevented Mobutu from nationalizing its immense property. 

Many pastors denounced Mobutu’s dictatorship, corruption, tribalism, irregularities in the electoral process, restrictions of fundamental freedom, rebellions leading to systematic rape of women in Kivu and Kasai. Christoph Munzihirza, Archbishop of Bukavu (1994-1996) worked in Kivu, where tranquility has been wrenched away by the selfish interests of multinational companies. This Mzee (‘Wise Man’) followed Christ so far as to make the supreme sacrifice: dying as witness and servant of justice, peace, and reconciliation.

In the 1990s, with the advent of perestroika, the Catholic Church of Congo once again was in the spotlight of the political process of democracy for the then Zaire. Christians took to the streets of Kinshasa to demand the reopening of the Sovereign National Conference (SNC) that President Mobutu had suspended. His police and military bloodily suppressed the protest on 12 February 1992. During these years of uncertainty, the Church was strengthened by the election of one of its pastors, Cardinal Laurent Mosengwo, then Bishop of Kisangani as SNC chairman. From that time he became one of the central figures of Congo politics.

The Church’s stance is not always welcomed by the government in Kinshasa. In December 2017 a group of Catholics, named the Lay Committee of Coordination (LCC), supported by the Archdiocese of Kinshasa and the Apostolic Nuncio, initiated peaceful marches to demand the full implementation of the political agreement signed under the aegis of the CENCO on 31 December 2016. The marches departed from different parishes right after the Sunday Mass. People walked peacefully with Bible, branches, and rosaries in hand, singing religious songs. Impressively, the call echoed not only among Catholics, but also among other religious confessions, and political parties as well. The Congolese diaspora―in Rome, the USA, Paris, Belgium, and South Africa, etc.―relayed demonstrations against the oppressive regime in Kinshasa. Since then, the Catholic Church and its priests have become the government’s target. 

Today the real threat to the regime no longer comes from the Congolese opposition but from the spectacular mobilization of the LCC. Their marches have been met with brutal suppression. Police and military surrounded parishes in Kinshasa and other cities, using tear gas in the churches and shooting live bullets at the demonstrators, resulting in fatalities, many wounded, several hundred arrests, and much damage to churches, according to reports of NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, ACAJ, and the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Congo (MONUSCO). 

The Archbishop of Kinshasa, Cardinal Monsengwo sharply condemned the repression: 

We can only denounce, condemn and stigmatize the behavior of our supposedly courageous men in uniform, who, sadly... are channeling barbarism. It is time for truth to win out over systemic lying, for the mediocre to clear out and for peace and justice to reign in DR Congo. How will we trust leaders incapable of protecting the people, of guaranteeing peace, justice, love of the people? How will we trust leaders who flout the religious freedom of the people, religious freedom that is the foundation of all freedoms? (Press Conference, 2 January 2018) 

In a body politic where almost no internal organ is functioning properly, the Church is, for DR Congo, the only existing structure that can get others on board to adhere to its decisions, from the top of the hierarchy to the grassroots. Driven by the Gospel and enlightened by the social teachings of the Church, the ecclesial community in Congo remains faithful to its prophetic mission: ‘proclaim the word, in good times and bad, refute, threaten, exhort, with tireless patience and the desire to instruct’(CENCO, Message of 23 June 2017). The CENCO’s positions and guidelines give, in most cases, a glimmer of hope to the Congolese people, and many appreciate them as relevant to their lives, impartial, and appealing. The Church urges people to resist thetemptation of fatalism, and to take their destiny in hand with hope. Its mission of promoting peace and reconciliation puts pressure on politicians and reflects the people’s thirst for real political change.

References

Eboussi-Boulaga, Fabien (1977). La crise du Muntu: Authenticitéafricaine et philosophie. Paris, Présence Africaine.

Ndiaye, Adjaratou Wakha Aidara, ed. (2015). Le dialogue national comme outil de prévention et de résolution des conflits en Afrique. Partners West Africa Centre for Civic Collaboration.

Okitembo, Luis Ngomo (1998). L’engagement politique de l’Eglise catholique au Zaïre.Paris: L’Harmattan.

Onaotsho Kawende, Jean (2016). Rationalitépluraliste, éthique et société.Louvain-la-Neuve: Académia-L’Harmattan.

Pour citer cet article: 

The Japan mission journal, Vol. 72, N°2. Summer 2018, pp 139-144.                                           ISSN 1344-7297